Ruthenia: the next South Ossetia?

What is well known regarding Ukrainian geopolitics is the east-west divide that threatens to splinter the country. The east is solidly in Russia’s camp and is resistant to any move at a national level toward NATO, the EU, and the Western Powers generally. In fact, many in the east are Russian – they speak Russian; they rise when the Russian anthem is played or the Republic’s flag is flown; and, increasingly, many of them carry Russian passports, a condition shared with folks in South Ossetia and that, in part, provided Russia with a pretext to invade Georgia this past summer.

Western Ukraine, on the other hand, is almost wholly Ukrainian, and despite sharing some common elements from the Slavic family tree, have come to despise the Russians. Two forced famines, thousands of forced relocations, and a brutal extirpation of national identity will tend to make enemies of neighbors. Aside from the horrific track record of 20th century Russia’s behavior toward Ukraine, many folks in Ukraine’s western regions self-identify more closely with Europe proper; part of the connection is historical – large swathes of Ukraine once flew the flag of the Austrian Hapsburg dynasty and share in (at least, historically) the polyglot, cosmopolitan air of formerly Hapsburg cities, such as Lviv and Chernivtsi.

The main fault line in Ukrainian politics tends to run as noted above and is roughly consistent with the Dnieper River, which cuts the country in half. When talk of succession occurs, it is normally in relation to this fault. What is less well known is that, within the western regions of Ukraine, there is another fault line, and movement along this fault have created a potentially dangerous geopolitical earthquake this week.


What is Ruthenia? What is Ukraine?

One way of understanding Ukraine is to apply the theory of borderlands as articulated by George Friedman, founder and CEO of Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (Indeed, the name Ukrayina has been thought, historically, to have derived from a Slavic term for borderland.) In a 2006 essay, Friedman explained borderlands as places “where the borders have shifted, leaving members of one nation stranded on the other side of the frontier.” He continued:

In many cases, these people now hold the citizenship of the countries in which they reside (according to recognized borders), but they think and speak in the language on the other side of the border. The border moved, but their homes didn't. There has been no decisive geographical event; they have not left their homeland. Only the legal abstraction of a border, and the non-abstract presence of a conquering army, has changed their reality.

Ukraine itself is an immense borderland area and has been for a very long time. To Russian nationalists, Ukraine is but a branch of the Russian tree, one of “The Russias,” which is joined at the hip, or at least, via the Kremlin. As observed above, many Ukrainians in the east of the country would agree; however, there are sufficient numbers of Ukrainians who ardently oppose such a rendering of history, who cite differences in language and culture as being markers of a separate ethnicity.

While the markers of ethnic difference are easily appreciated, it does not necessarily follow that a national identity can accrete around these differences. The problem is that there is no one idea of Ukraine among non-Russian Ukrainians. While their differences with Russia are notable, being “non-Russian” isn’t quite enough to create a viable national sentiment. Ukraine is, therefore, fissiparous and can be nearly ungovernable. Within that context, then, it should not be a surprise to discover this week that Ruthenian separatists have declared independence from Ukraine proper.

Befitting such a vast hinterland, ethnonyms and placenames are very slippery things along the edges of the old Hapsburg Empire. Dr. Friedman’s Stratfor organization, in its report of this week’s events, characterized the Ruthenians as “a small ethnic group living in the Carpathian Mountains,” but don’t tell that to the Ukrainian government, who count Ruthenians as Ukrainian in its national census, probably because most Ruthenians self-identified as such to census-takers. Don’t tell it to the Central Intelligence Agency either – in its ethnic breakdown of Ukraine, the CIA World Factbook merely uses the Ukrainian government’s census count. This probably tracks most Westerners’ view of Ruthenians – in other words, they haven’t existed for all intents and purposes.

Historically, “Ruthenia” and “Ruthenian” have been applied to a variety of regions and peoples. It’s a tangled, knotted history where borders shift frequently and foreign influences, whether from Moscow, Krakow, Prague, or Vienna, intermix and create beautiful, but fractious, ethnic tapestries. The people who today call themselves – or are called by others – “Ruthenian” are basically a mountain folk cut off from the rest of western Ukraine by the Carpathians and by the Dniester River and who have had a somewhat cross relationship with the Ukrainian nationalism radiated forth from Kiev.


More Ukrainian than not, the Ruthenians represent a troubling shade of gray in what we’d like to be a picture of simple blacks and whites. For example, is the Rusyn tongue of the Carpatho-Ruthenians a language, properly speaking, or merely a dialect of Ukrainian? And what are the specific political gripes upon which Ruthenian separatism is premised? These questions cannot be easily answered, certainly not in this space today.

In fact, it is easy to become utterly confused as to who, precisely, these Ruthenians are. Because modern-day Ruthenia is located in the Trans-Carpathian region of western Ukraine, one might be led to think that they are as anti-Russian as the rest of the region, but then, if this is so, why did the Ruthenians appeal to Russia first and foremost when they declared independence?

There is no easy answer from a larger historical or geopolitical perspective. While not as Russophobic as their neighbors in the Galicia region of western Ukraine, Ruthenians cannot be said to have any strong inclination toward the Russians, either. More likely, the separatists’ growing frustration with Kiev is pushing them toward an alliance of convenience, but as I wish to explain, they are doing this at their own peril – and that of their Ukrainian compatriots.


The Orange Revolution Caught in a Vise

I won’t bother to recount here in great detail the heavy-handed tactics with which the Russians have been elbowing Ukraine toward greater tractability regarding Russia’s geopolitical interests. The Russians have used threats, both subtle and overt; they have cruelly shut off the natural gas taps to Ukraine just as the brutal winter approaches; they have possibly even attempted political assassination via dioxin poisoning in the case of Viktor Yushchenko (fairness compels me to state here that it was never determined to anyone’s satisfaction what role the Russians played in this affair). All of this has been done in order to pull Ukraine out of NATO’s orbit. Given the immense geopolitical importance of Ukraine to Russia, not only as a warm-weather place to park its warships, but also as a transit point for Russian gas to high-value markets in Central and Western Europe, it is not really surprising to find Russia leaning on its smaller neighbor.

Inside of Ukraine itself, this belligerence predictably aggravates the conflict between the country’s competing blocs of eastern Russophiles and western Russophobes. Up until this week, however, the Ruthenians have been a minor consideration within this context. By reaching out to Russia for recognition of its independence, Ruthenia has become the flashpoint du jour in Russia-Ukraine relations. Now the liberal, pro-NATO forces within Ukraine must contend with not only the eastern pro-Russian regions of the country, but with Ruthenia as well. This is not trivial, and if mishandled, the question of Ruthenian independence could well become an existential one for Ukraine itself.

Absent any great fellow feeling for the Russians by the Ruthenians, the puzzling thing here is why the Ruthenians looked to Moscow in declaring independence. One obvious answer is because it absolutely could not look toward the west. NATO has zero interest in an independent Ruthenia, and I am quite certain that neighboring countries in the Trans-Carpathian region feel the same.

Russia, on the other hand, has manifold reasons for stirring the pot. Most obviously, the appeal for Russian recognition gives the Russians cards to play in what is otherwise an internal Ukrainian matter, much as Abkhazia and South Ossetia were Russian levers inside of Georgia.

Second, it puts pressure on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for a neighbor eyeing choice bits of Ukrainian soil – such as the naval bases of the Crimean peninsula and Black Sea coast – change is certainly better than the status quo (remember, the Russian lease on Ukrainian naval facilities expires in 2017).

Third, even if the Russians have no designs on Ukrainian territory, the geopolitical pressure created by a succession crisis could very well be enough to arrest Ukraine’s slow movement toward NATO and the EU, an outcome that is absolutely unacceptable to Russia.

Given these large, weighty geopolitical goals, the quid pro quo looks puny when viewed from the Ruthenian side of the ledger. Even if Ruthenian independence is achieved, what good is it if Ukraine as we know it ceases to exist? How secure would that independence be in a geopolitical environment dominated by Russia?

Another puzzling question here is how and why did Ruthenian relations with Kiev sour to such a degree that such a “nuclear option” could be contemplated? Is it merely the product of short-sighted nationalism or are there such real and legitimate political grievances that would lead the Ruthenians to this most dangerous conclusion?

Surely, we will learn more in the days and weeks ahead, but if I had to posit a guess today, I would say that the Ruthenian separatists, emboldened by the Russians, took the bait and acted rashly, not as a method for winning independence outright, but rather to gain a stronger advantage at the bargaining table with Kiev. What they fail to appreciate, however, is that the Russians are no more interested in Ruthenian independence than are the Western Powers – as soon as Russia gains the concessions it desires from Kiev, the Ruthenians’ agenda will not rate much of an audience in the Kremlin.