The Hezbollah quandary, two years on

Next month, two years will have passed since the brief, hot war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel. At the time I had completely misread the war and was indeed baffled by its outcome: a bloody nose for Israel, at least, in political terms. Its decision to pursue, almost exclusively, an air war against Hezbollah resulted in much collateral destruction to Lebanese villages, but inflicted relatively little damage on Hezbollah itself.

I summarized the end of hostilities with the following:

The most favorable interpretation of the cease fire would see Israel admitting a small, short-term defeat in order to avoid what could have been a larger one over time. The Israelis were outwitted, and rather than flying off into a rage and throwing the full force of the Israeli army against Hezbollah, it would be better to bide one’s time and let the international community take a crack at softening up the enemy.

Much has changed since the August 2006 cease fire. One of the nagging problems faced by Israeli military planners in fighting Hezbollah was the tacit support that Syria (and by extension, Iran) and certain Lebanese offered the guerrillas. This complicated the conflict considerably. Not only did Israel’s chosen strategy – a raiding logistics strategy via an air campaign – fail to knock out Hezbollah’s infrastructure, it created a public-relations nightmare as innocent (and not-so-innocent) Lebanese suffered collateral damage. When Israel thought itself ready to commence ground operations, Hezbollah’s ability to wage war had not been degraded sufficiently, and the likelihood of high casualties for Israel was too great. Hence the cease fire. Or so it seemed at the time.

But now, as Israel and Syria apparently stand ready to ink a broad understanding, the strategic calculus is shifting against Hezbollah. Without open lines of communication and supply, the guerrillas would have no chance against sustained Israeli pressure. Strategic Forecasting argues as much this morning in its Geopolitical Diary:

“Although Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Syrian President Bashar al Assad have not publicly sealed an agreement yet, we have seen a number of indications that the Syrians are taking steps to reduce Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon. Cooperation between Syria and Israel spells serious trouble for Hezbollah, as any deal between the two countries will have to involve Syria cracking down on the militant group and weakening its position in Lebanon.”

Stratfor also points out that this bleak future for Hezbollah is exacerbating internal divisions within the organization. The older generation of leadership appears ready to enter Lebanon’s civil-political arena and has grown wealthy due to its business relationships with the country’s former Syrian masters; however, younger leaders in Hezbollah view any accommodation with Israel as a betrayal and stand ready to fight, come what may.

The peace deal between Israel and Syria has some way to go yet before it is a fait accompli, but the broad outline of an understanding has been in the works for years. Haaretz reported in May the existence of a “non-paper,” a document of understandings prepared in 2005. Essentially, the framework calls for Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the 1967 border and for Syria to end its support for Hezbollah and Hamas and distance itself from Iran.

This agreement was purportedly in the works long before Hezbollah went off the rails in the summer of 2006 and goes a long way toward explaining why I didn’t get what was happening two summers ago. When viewed against the backdrop of intense, covert Israeli-Syrian dialogue, the bizarre military strategy and restraint demonstrated by Israel begin to make more sense; likewise, too, does Hezbollah’s sudden, unexplainable hostility at the time. Perhaps Hezbollah caught wind that the peace talks were rapidly advancing, and its war-making was an attempt at sabotage.

At any rate, should events fall out roughly in line with the non-paper, Hezbollah and Hamas will be under severe pressure to transform themselves into purely political parties, which could go a long way toward bringing a measure of stability to the region and enabling the international community to offer assistance to Palestine and Lebanon in good conscience. It would no doubt be the most important diplomatic undertaking since Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty in 1979.