Sometimes silence is the better part of blogging. I certainly have felt that way regarding the recent war and cease fire in Lebanon. My initial thoughts were that the Israelis would very quickly achieve their objectives, overrun Hezbollah defenses, and remove the terrorist threat on their northern border. Fairly early on, though, one could get the sense that the war was not playing out that way, and I kept relatively quiet, not knowing what to make of the unusually stout Arab defense. Instead, I offered up a few musings—here and here—on just-war theory, as the inclination struck me, but mostly because I couldn’t make heads or tails of this latest conflict. And still can’t.
In unpacking the events of the past two months, I tried to understand Israel’s military operations. Any time an army faces a guerilla force—and Hezbollah is just that—commanders have two sets of strategies to contemplate. First, one must decide upon what is called a persisting strategy or a raiding strategy. Persisting strategies led one to occupy land; they require high force-to-space ratios and generally translate into higher casualties. A raiding strategy does not seek to hold land, but rather to cripple the guerilla force by selectively striking at high-value targets that are lightly defended. This often results in fewer casualties for the raiders, but the success of this strategy often depends upon good intelligence and often translates into political capitulations rather than an unambiguous military victory.
The second set of strategic options concerns the targets themselves. When using a combat strategy, the targets are the guerillas themselves; however, if one chooses a logistics strategy, one’s target is not enemy soldiers so much as the means with which they wage war. A commander’s decision in this regard is often predicated upon resources available to the guerilla; if a guerilla army is using only low-tech methods of waging war, it makes little sense to focus too much on their logistics. Conversely, if one is facing an extremely large guerilla army, a logistics strategy might be the most cost-effective means of gaining victory.
When applying the above considerations to the recent war in Lebanon, one can see readily that the Israelis settled upon the wrong strategy. At the beginning of the conflict, Israel waged an unrelenting air war, similar to what NATO did in Serbia in 1999. Air wars, by their very nature, employ a raiding strategy, and in this most recent case, was paired with a logistics strategy. From the beginning, most commentators assumed this air war was in preparation for a large ground offensive, but it became obvious as events played out that there were many within Israel who seriously thought victory could be achieved solely by means of the air force. As Hezbollah rockets continued to rain down on northern Israel, political pressure became such that ground operations had to be undertaken. But they were done so half-heartedly, and rumors of a cease fire were in the air as soon as troops crossed the border in earnest, leading one to presume that Israel did not want to fight a costly war against a well-armed foe at this time.
In this week’s Economist, there is an interesting special report on the means and ends of air power. While serving as an excellent history lesson, the article attempts to distinguish between successful air campaigns and those that have failed, concluding:
But when it comes to rooting out guerrillas and insurgents, wishful thinking still tends to outweigh technological capabilities. A study of the use of air power in small wars over the past century by James Corum and Wray Johnson, two former professors at the American air force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, concluded that insurgents and terrorists “rarely present lucrative targets for aerial attack”. Air power has been used to greatest effect in such campaigns only indirectly: to gather intelligence, move troops or maintain communication.
And as others besides the Israelis have found, trying to wage an air campaign against irregular forces is especially vulnerable to the backlash that invariably arises as civilian casualties mount. Since terrorists and guerrillas blend into the civilian population, fight in small units and rely on surprise and mobility, accurate and timely intelligence is crucial, and bad intelligence always results in civilian casualties, sometimes lots of them. Moreover, dropping a bomb in an urban area, even when the intelligence is correct, and even when the bomb is precision-guided, is likely to kill innocent neighbours.
Collateral damage notwithstanding, the key concept here from a military strategy perspective is the lack of targets in guerilla conflicts. Air power was decisive in Serbia because Serbia itself was a thoroughly modern country, highly dependent upon its infrastructural assets. In effect, Slobodan Milošević had a choice to make: remain defiant and run the risk of a popular coup, or capitulate and save the country’s ability to feed itself and employ its citizens. Obviously, guerilla outfits needn’t worry about that. The strategic choice made by Israel—the raiding logistics strategy—failed because it could not destroy a significant amount of ordnance and supplies. Its chief advantage, that of low casualties, was canceled out by the fact that it could not degrade the fighting capability of the enemy. All it really did was put a few thousand Lebanese out of their homes.
Hence the cease fire. The most favorable interpretation of the cease fire would see Israel admitting a small, short-term defeat in order to avoid what could have been a larger one over time. The Israelis were outwitted, and rather than flying off into a rage and throwing the full force of the Israeli army against Hezbollah, it would be better to bide one’s time and let the international community take a crack at softening up the enemy. At the very least, the peacekeeping force will introduce a variable into an otherwise dismal military equation.
I say that Israel was outwitted because it seems that, at every step of the latest conflict, Hezbollah was one step ahead, and the conflict began to resemble a kind of bait-and-switch job. Despite being the party that was initially attacked, Israel had managed to squander much of its international goodwill, the result (perhaps) of a very astute press strategy by Hezbollah, who seems to understand the international community better than it understands itself. Also, it became obvious to Israel, as it probed and scouted Lebanese territory, that this conflict perhaps was not the random event it seemed to be. Hezbollah was dug into its positions, as if such a conflict had been planned for years. And then, of course, there is the little matter of the rockets. Few guerrilla outfits have been as well-armed as Hezbollah, and it didn’t get that way overnight. In short, the Israelis sensed a trap, and called a time out. Kadima might suffer in the polls for it, but in retrospect, a bloody nose is preferable to a bullet between the eyes.
In any event, given its current advantages, a raiding logistics strategy will not work in crippling Hezbollah. And yet, a persisting combat strategy has too high a price for Israel. What to do, then?
In what is the most cynical interpretation of events that I’ve read to date—but perhaps not incorrect—George Friedman of Strategic Forecasting wrote the following concerning the cease fire:
Surely Israel regrets its acceptance of the cease-fire in the first place, knowing that despite pledges the Lebanese army now will not disarm Hezbollah? Surely Israel is concerned that a U.N. force—and especially one that is Italian-led—not only would fail to disarm Hezbollah but would allow Hezbollah to make a mockery out of international efforts? Surely Israel knows that an inefficiently run peacekeeping operation might lead to an even-less-stable Lebanon, requiring Israel to act to defend its interests?
Precisamente.
Time will tell if Mr. Friedman’s view is the correct one, but given the general unpreparedness of Israel concerning this latest conflict, the chance to take a deep breath and re-evaluate its military strategy can only be of benefit. In any event, this conflict is far from over.
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