The ayatollah’s long arm

Early this week, perhaps even today, Israel will invade Lebanon, and we will get to see all those fancy new weapons which Iran has supplied to Hezbollah, the new Kalashnikovs, the Katyushas, and the improvised explosive devices. For Israel, the greatest danger at this point lies in not quite knowing whether the Syrians plan to sit this one out. Early indications from Syria’s diplomacy suggest it will indeed stay home. It has opened its borders to Western nationals fleeing Lebanon and has been generally mum otherwise. If Syria does stay home, this should be a fairly academic exercise, with the Israelis routing whatever Hezbollah forces they encounter during their excursion.

Hezbollah is fanatical, not stupid. They, too, realize that a conventional confrontation with the Israeli Defense Force is a no-brainer. The best they can do is stand their ground until the situation is all but lost, inflict as many casualties as they can, and then withdraw, taking with them as many weapons and as much ordnance as they can carry. But where will they go? This is where Syria again becomes a key player, whether its soldiers stay home or not.

If Hezbollah begins a tactical retreat inside of Syria, it will force the Israelis to make a choice: (a) allow them to retreat with their weapons, thereby dulling the whole point of an invasion, or (b) pursue them inside Syria and risk drawing the Syrians into open conflict. This choice, if you’re Israel, is not a very good one. It also explains why the Israelis have been dogged in their effort to knock out a good deal of the civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, hoping that disruptions of power, transportation, gasoline, and the like will introduce delays into any planned retreat by Hezbollah. As soon as significant numbers of Hezbollah fighters have been painted inside of Syria, the decision to pursue has to be quick one and will require a fairly accurate inventory of what has been accomplished, i.e. how many have been killed or captured, how many caches seized or destroyed, etc. Ultimately, the decision to enter Syria will be guided by the Israelis' assessment of whether Hezbollah has been sufficiently downgraded as a fighting force. If the goals of the invasion have not been met by that point in time, then the Israelis will have no choice but to enter Syrian territory, and then all bets are off as to next steps.

Hezbollah’s two main patrons over the years have been the Syrians and the Iranians, but with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon earlier this year, Syria has diminished sway over Hezbollah, and therefore, Hezbollah would likely not be too concerned about dragging the Syrians into the conflict, which can only be to the group’s advantage.

It’s strange that, one month ago, we were pondering in this space the likelihood of a Palestinian civil war between Hamas and Fatah, and then suddenly, with the Palestinian internal situation decaying, Hezbollah rises like the Phoenix, and although the CIA had issued warnings since the spring that we could expect Hezbollah to begin asserting itself again, the timing of the specific attacks upon Israel is curious. America’s occupation of Iraq—Iran’s nuclear program—the Palestinian conflict…these are the three fixed points in the Middle East currently, and any attempt to theorize what might have prompted Hezbollah to act this month must be viewed within the context those three points provide.

There are six main actors involved in the three events ticked off above: the US, Iran, Israel, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Of those six, only one country has nothing at risk in the expected Israeli offensive, and that country is Iran. It is acting via proxy (Hezbollah) and thus has no exposure; the US would occupy a similar position of proxy conflict (via Israel) were it not for the 170,000 US troops stationed in Iraq. This presence opens the US to significant exposure to risk, especially should Iran’s proxies in Iraq make trouble. The key to the US position, at least this year, has been a de facto partnership with the Iraqi Shiites, by which the US hopes to achieve nominal peace and to draw in slowly the Sunni insurgents. Should the Shiites go off the rails, the US position could deteriorate rather quickly; therefore, the US response to the Israeli offensive against the Shiite Hezbollah must be measured and calculated against such a potential risk…and Iran knows this. I would think the risk taken on by the remaining four actors is self-evident and will not elaborate further.

Any potential Israeli offensive into Lebanon (and potentially Syria) also serves Iranian ends by distracting the international community from Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. Witness this weekend’s G-8 meetings in St. Petersburg; note how much dialogue and press time were dedicated to the deteriorating conditions on the Israeli-Lebanese border…that is valuable time and airspace not dedicated to the Iranians’ nuke program. Also, the US or Israel is less likely to strike at Iran while the Israelis are moving in force through Lebanon or Syria.

So the big winner here, at least in the short term, is Iran, which is, presumably, why it elected to activate Hezbollah when it did.