If/Then

For those commentators and politicians who are not simply contrary for contrariness’s sake, the current situation in Iraq presents a classic if/then dilemma. The Bush administration’s current ‘surge’ strategy could be formulated as:

If we build a positive security environment, then the Iraqi government can build a viable coalition to rule the country.

Opponents of the surge—and I was one—countered that this concept had things backwards, that, first, there needs to be a lasting political settlement, then we could work on the security environment.

General David Petraeus is due next week to testify before Congress concerning his impressions of the current surge strategy, both its successes and failures. He will likely report that security conditions on the ground are much improved since last fall, and on this score, I do not doubt that the general is correct. His impressions of the security environment, if my projection is accurate, have been confirmed recently by several Congressmen, both Republican and Democrat, who have visited the country.

Also, Gen. Petraeus will likely tell us that progress on the political front has not kept pace with the work of the US armed forces. This, too, would be a correct assessment, as most organizations tasked with assessing the Iraqi government have given it failing grades. The General Accounting Office, for instance, testified yesterday before the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations that progress has been slow to non-existent:

“As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds.”

It should be noted that the US military has publicly disavowed the GAO report, claiming that report’s analysis extended only through the month of July. I don’t disagree that the report has flaws, but I don’t sense that the flaws controvert the main thrust of the evidence that clearly shows the Iraqi government to be inept.

The surge strategy, at root, was a Field of Dreams solution to the problem before us—“build it and they will come.” But the truth is that they have not come. By undertaking an unsustainable military surge, we have merely clamped down our thumbs and fingers to slow the hemorrhage, but ultimately, Iraq’s body politic must heal on its own, and our surge has done nothing to promote that healing. We have merely frozen in time the antipathies and grudges that would surely spring to life if ever our military presence slackened. At the moment, the key figures in Iraqi politics are merely biding their time, waiting for our inevitable departure.

To those who desire a longer-term military commitment to Iraq, the question that must be answered is how long must we police the country in order to see some political progress. It’s a loaded question, for there is no way of knowing beforehand the answer. It could be years, and after such time, there could be an avalanche of goodwill that all at once gets things moving in the right direction…or not. This mission could simply peter out into a stewardship of an eternally fixed status quo. There simply is no way of knowing.

Often, wealth and economic growth can be a salve, but for all our successes on the ground, the Iraqi security situation is still perilous; oil production is still far below our best estimates of a few years ago (remember the claim that this war would pay for itself?); public services are still woefully spotty; government accountability is still shamefully slack. And in the most restive regions, these problems persist to even greater degree. So, again, the question remains: How long would the true believers have us occupy the country?

When General Petraeus reports to Congress next week, I am sure there will be many folks who will seize upon the good news and conveniently skip over the discouraging parts. I would like to congratulate the General in advance for the work he and his troops have done, but I’m afraid we cannot endure another year’s open-ended commitment to Iraq. Our troops are thin and weary; our purse is light. It’s time to transfer responsibility for Iraq to the Iraqis via a phased withdrawal of troops. Once the process of downsizing our presence in Iraq is underway, I would not be averse to rethinking the strategy mid-stream, whether that means slowing down or speeding up the pull out.

I realize that a withdrawal will likely result in our return to Iraq within the next decade. Perhaps next time we will have political leadership that is up to the task.