Like a cynical, lemon-sucking uncle at Sunday dinner, Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (Stratfor) is generally very quick to point out the naked self-interest at work on today’s geopolitical stage, as one would expect from an organization guided by realpolitik (not that THE DIVAGATOR entirely disagrees). So when Stratfor reported last week on the warming of relations between the Vatican and the People’s Republic of China, it was not at all surprising that the thaw was attributed not to beneficence, but rather to China’s growing concern over potential social unrest and the Church’s role as a potential ally in the future.
Stratfor has long asserted that the China we know and warily observe is really two Chinas: the rich, commercial coastal area that has boomed since the country embarked on its program of economic modernization, and the vast hinterland, largely poor and agricultural, whose peasants have been left behind. This steadily growing economic inequality has an enormous potential for civil unrest, and no one is more aware of this than the leaders of China’s Communist Party; after all, it was due to peasant unrest that the Party first assumed power, now almost 60 years ago. Stratfor has consistently remained contrarian during the explosion of wealth in China, suggesting that the country’s Number One problem over the long term will be in moderating the effects of growing too wealthy too fast. Without wise policies in place to manage the creation and distribution of wealth, China’s Communists could find themselves in a very similar predicament to that of the Kuomintang, the party it vanquished to Taiwan in 1949. Stratfor’s reasoning is that all bubbles eventually burst, and when the Chinese economy cools off, the real challenge for China will then begin.
The challenge will be manifest in two different areas. First, there is the realm of finance, including fiscal and monetary policy, trade policy, banking regulations, and the like. The second area is essentially social, cultural and political. Obviously, the two areas are interconnected, as the success or failure of policies in one area will impact the other, but considering both areas as separate and distinct does provide some measure of definition about what the challenges are.
In stemming any social unrest resulting from a potential economic crisis, the Communists are quickly learning that it can use all the help it can get. One can lean on the wealthy coastal elites only so hard until the engine that drives the Chinese economy collapses beneath the weight of government interference; therefore, at some point, it will become necessary to appeal to the peasants’ sense of order, law, and duty. This, at least according to Stratfor, is where the Catholic Church comes in, or as they had it yesterday:
With the Vatican’s proven power to mobilize citizens, as well as the growing number of Roman Catholics in China, the Chinese recognize that cooperating with the Vatican will help to prevent future internal disorder. And China’s willingness to cooperate is yet another indication that Beijing is making preparations for an impending economic crisis. By working with the Vatican, Beijing hopes to weave another safety net to help contain fallout from an economic crisis and prevent widespread domestic unrest.
But how influential is the Roman Catholic Church in China? Most estimates put the number of Chinese Catholics at around 12 million. From one perspective, this is a very large number, larger than the total population of many Catholic countries (Ireland and Portugal come to mind); but from another perspective, that number still represents less than 1% of the total Chinese population. So, again, how influential can 1% be?
Unless, of course, that 1% is a gross underestimation of the Catholic population in China, for no one is really quite sure how many Catholics there are in China. The Communist government is famously secretive about such things, and due to the underground nature of much of the Catholic Church in China, it is very difficult to assess the situation. Furthermore, the rate of growth of the Catholic Church likely places it among the fastest-growing faiths in the country, attracting not only peasants, but wealthy coastal elites as well. When viewed along with the fast-growing Protestant sects, it is not unreasonable to assume that China will be 10% Christian—representing over 130 million people—one generation from now, and at that point, yes, that’s quite a bit of influence, such that the Communist Party must reckon with it.
Rapprochement, if it is to occur, would have to tackle three outstanding problems. First, the nature of the Chinese Catholic Church itself is quite complex and strange due to the unique set of circumstances that conditioned its growth and development. Upon coming to power, the Communist Party expelled missionaries and later sought to place the Church itself under its direct control by organizing the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), a quasi-state agency that would, in effect, administrate the Church. The CCPA had no ties to the Vatican and instead took its marching orders from the state. The creation of the CCPA introduced a split into the Chinese Catholic Church, as those who rejected the CCPA were forced underground. Over time, relations between the state-recognized Catholic Church and the underground Catholics became frosty and fractious, such that Pope John Paul II often appealed for comity between Catholics in China; therefore, if reconciliation is to occur between the Vatican and the Chinese government, it must start between the two Catholic groups themselves. This process is well under way, as the Vatican has given an official nod to several CCPA bishops, but the union of the CCPA and the underground church is a long way from a done deal.
This first issue leads us on to a second outstanding problem, the ordination of bishops. The Communist Party—through the CCPA—usurped the Pope’s authority in this regard, and naturally, the Vatican would like to have it back. The root of the problem goes back to April 1958, when two bishops were consecrated in Hankou Cathedral without the recognition of the Pope, compelling Pius XII to issue Ad apostolorum principis, an encyclical letter reiterating the legitimacy of papal authority, proclaiming:
From what We have said, it follows that no authority whatsoever, save that which is proper to the Supreme Pastor, can render void the canonical appointment granted to any bishop; that no person or group, whether of priests or of laymen, can claim the right of nominating bishops; that no one can lawfully confer episcopal consecration unless he has received the mandate of the Apostolic See.
Consequently, if consecration of this kind is being done contrary to all right and law, and by this crime the unity of the Church is being seriously attacked, an excommunication reserved specialissimo modo to the Apostolic See has been established which is automatically incurred by the consecrator and by anyone who has received consecration irresponsibly conferred.
In a stroke of extreme wisdom—or mere fortuitous luck—the Vatican did not seek to excommunicate those who later filled the bishoprics and other positions within the Chinese Church hierarchy. In effect, there was no schism with Rome, merely the uncomfortable situation of having clergy unrecognized by Rome. By some accounts, the Chinese Church actually gained in strength—at least, over a period of many years—due to this fissure. Writing in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion in 2002, William T. Liu & Beatrice Leung argued that:
…the revitalization of the Catholic Church in China was through indigenization of the Church. The vitalization has been achieved despite tensions between the underground church committed to Rome and the national church, which advocated self-government without political and financial ties to the Catholic hierarchies outside China. Both the Chinese government’s accommodation of the ecclesiastical authority of the papacy, and the Vatican’s silence in response to the underground church’s pleas to disregard the national church, had helped the indigenization process and the growth of the church without a possible schism.
The issues of ordination and papal authority are hardly relics from China’s revolutionary past. In 2005, several new Chinese bishops chosen by the Vatican received government approval, which at the time seemed to point to a reconciliation of sorts, but throughout 2006, three bishops—Joseph Ma Yinglin of Kunming, Joseph Liu Xinhong of Anhui and John Wang Renlei of Xuzhou—were ordained without papal approval. These ordinations clearly indicated that the Communist Party—working through CCPA—had no intention of exiting church affairs, prompting Church officials to convene a meeting this weekend to discuss the situation. It is reported that the Pope intends to write a letter to the Chinese government calling for ‘normal diplomatic relations.’
The third outstanding issue is perhaps the thorniest whereas ‘normal diplomatic relations’ are concerned.
Trivia Question: What is the only government in Europe that provides diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China (Taiwan)?
If you answered the Vatican, you would be correct, and as you might imagine, this fact presents a major stumbling block to the Vatican’s quest to normalize its relationship with the People’s Republic. After the Communists defeated the Kuomintang in 1949, The Holy See maintained its relationship with the vanquished government, which had removed itself to Taiwan. Unlike most states in the world, the Vatican has stood firm on this point and has never revoked Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition. Any rapprochement between the Vatican and Beijing no doubt will need to traverse this bumpy road.
Should the Vatican withdraw its recognition of Taiwan and shift it to Beijing? My first impression would be an emphatic No. First, it would be unseemly for the Vatican to use Taiwan’s status as a diplomatic lever; either the Taiwanese count in the Vatican’s vision of the City of Man, or they don’t. In short, the status of Taiwan should be considered as separate and distinct from that of the mainland. Besides, shifting diplomatic relations would give the appearance of rewarding years upon years of Communist coercion and duplicity. How demoralizing it would be to shift diplomatic ties only to discover that the ‘deal’ struck with the Communist Party was a bait-and-switch job, where promises are not kept and papal authority is in name only.
Writing for the conservative National Review, Doug Bandow provides further arguments against any change in the Vatican’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, stating:
…Taiwan should not be sacrificed lightly. Although the Vatican’s role is not (or, at least, should not be) primarily political, the Catholic Church’s relationship with the Republic of China has long affirmed the latter’s independent existence in the face of the PRC’s determination to swallow the small island state.
Obviously, Taiwan’s status is not a theological matter. However, since human rights, including religious liberty, are respected there but not on the mainland, the Vatican can and should seek to bolster Taiwan’s status. Given the growing cultural and economic relations between the two Chinas, over the long-term a free Taiwan is likely to make for a freer PRC.
Given these things, I do not foresee a reconciliation in the near term between China and The Holy See that would entail (a) the Vatican’s revocation of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan or (b) the PRC’s dismantling of the CCPA, divesting its authority over the Chinese Church, which is not to say that there might be smaller, confidence-building steps in the interim.
Besides, if Stratfor is correct in its analysis of Chinese motives, the Vatican would do well to bide its time and wait for a day when the price of cooperation isn’t quite so high.
No comments:
Post a Comment