The naughty and the nice

Last week, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) made its list and checked it twice, releasing its long-awaited report on the state of affairs in Iraq with its recommendations for further action. Some of the 79 recommendations were little more than common sense; some were nebulous, vague, hopelessly open-ended examples of pabulum; and some got down to the nitty-gritty of making the tough calls on what to do next.

Most of the recommendations had been leaked prior to the report’s release and were therefore not very surprising. But the one point that raised some eyebrows was the ISG’s rather firm calendar for a withdrawal of US troops. The White House immediately demurred on this point, choosing instead to stress the parts of the report that would seem to confirm President Bush’s steadfastness in staying the course. On the day following the report’s release, Bush stated in his weekly radio address,

I was also encouraged that the Iraq Study Group was clear about the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq. The group declared that such a withdrawal would ‘almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence’ and lead to ‘a significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization, and a threat to the global economy.’ The report went on to say, ‘If we leave and Iraq descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually require the United States to return.’

Of course, what Mr. Bush failed to address was that the Group committed us to a harder time-table for eventual withdrawal than the White House is comfortable with. The question, then, is whether or not a firm time-table for departure is a good idea. The answer to this question is a difficult one, but it is one that I believe most Americans have already answered.

To me, the answer comes down to this: do you believe that, given more time, this administration will succeed in its goals for Iraq? When asked in this way, the question no longer revolves around what is good in an abstract, strategic sense—I think most of us realize that US withdrawal will have potentially dire consequences. But ultimately, the administration has lost all credence on the matter; relatively few Americans believe that Team Bush can pilot this ship to safety. Most folks have come to the point of view that it would be better to return to Iraq later, under different leadership, even if the challenge at such time would be more daunting. After all, if the administration cannot come to terms with the region’s political landscape, more troops, less troops...it doesn’t really matter.

And at this point, we’ve chosen to back the political plan with the least likelihood of success, that of ‘standing up’ a multi-party, multi-sect Iraqi government, rather than choose sides. Many people feel our hands are tied in this regard. If we were to throw our support unequivocally to the Shiites, this decision would alienate our staunchest supporters in the Arab world. And then, of course, there would be the additional question—which Shiites would we support? Amid the many subplots of Iraq is the continuing poor relations between different Shiite sects...ah, wheels within wheels.

Why not, then, back the Sunnis? While the Egyptians and Saudis would cheer this decision, it is a practical impossibility for Iraq. The country is majority Shia, and after suffering for decades under the brutal hand of a Sunni-dominated government, the Shia will not—under any circumstances—condone a political settlement which gives the Sunnis a decisive role in the affairs of the country. There is this, and there is, too, the fact that most of the foreign jihadist elements within Iraq are Sunni. Al Qaeda itself is Sunni-funded and Sunni-led, and while the jihadists’ efforts have not always been embraced by the native Sunni population, as long as the threat of civil war persists, the natives will look to the jihadists to apply constant pressure to the Shiites, as well as their American sponsors.

It is this rock-and-hard-place circumstance that led the ISG to recommend a regional summit, including direct engagement with Iran and Syria. It is, after all, our relationships with various regional players that is in effect tying our hands in Iraq. It is not so hard, in a vacuum, to choose a strategy and implement it, but every potential decision we make will set off a domino chain heading off into directions we’d rather not contemplate.

The Bush administration is still resistant to including Iran and Syria in regional talks, and given our recent track record of being outflanked diplomatically and politically by the Iranians, I doubt a summit would produce the best-case scenario for the US. But the results of such a summit would definitely be better than the current no-case scenario. Whether we stay or go, there needs to be some degree of transparency between the decision making of regional powers, lest Iraq become the battleground of a wider Sunni-Shia conflict pitting the Iranians against our oil-rich Sunni clients. Without Iran and Syria at the table, any summit will be merely an academic exercise.