Those nettlesome Near East elections

We seem to have come to one of those historical pivot points in the Near East. Beginning with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in June 2005 and the coronation of King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia in August, through to the Palestinian elections of a few days ago and the Israeli elections set for this spring, the political make-up of the region will be vastly different come summertime than at the same juncture in 2005. The gallery of faces and parties in power has shifted, presenting the United States and regional leaders a short window to set the region on a favorable course for the next few years.

Much has been made of Hamas’ election victory in the American press this week, most of it of the foreboding variety. Over and against any lingering Palestinian antipathy for the USA, we should view the election result not as an ‘anti-American’ vote (though it certainly was that); rather, the result was more an act of desperation, a rejection of the hapless and corrupt Fatah-led government. Former Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O’Neill once famously quipped that ‘all politics is local,’ and this applies in force to Palestine. It seems reasonable to suggest that, far from flipping the rest of the world a long middle finger, Palestinians were simply venting against a miserable government doing a miserable job. Mahmoud Abbas, current President of the Palestine National Authority, deserves great credit for opening the electoral process to Hamas and then keeping to the time table for the elections.

While some might have preferred a closed election to a Hamas victory, this I believe is extremely short-sighted, although I readily admit that Hamas’ victory does highlight the fundamental contradiction of the official American policy vis-à-vis democracy in the Near East. On the one hand, we loudly support democracy in the Near East, and on the other, we loath the prospect of seeing Islamists and terrorists come to power via the ballot box. Further, this will inevitably occur in the Near East, not because Arabs necessarily love terrorists and religious hard-liners, but because the current parties in power have so poisoned the well of electoral politics, that the opposition – any opposition – almost always will look far better. If a similarly open election were held in any country in North Africa or on the Arabian peninsula, the same result would occur, which points not to an inherent anti-American attitude, but to the level of dissatisfaction with the current powers that be.

Iran, which it should be noted is not an Arab country, is an outlier here for another reason, for in Iran, the religious hard-liners comprise the party in power. A fair and open Iranian election would rout the mullahs from power, something they know very well, which is why the elections are rigged. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the virulent anti-Semite, Islamist, and populist, was elected President of Iran not because Iranians love his policy positions, but rather because the Ayatollah and his comrades had removed any serious opposition from the lists, barring the most influential and capable reformers from contesting the elections. The choice Iranians had last summer could not have inspired much excitement in the electorate about the country’s future prospects. Mr. Ahmadinejad was pitted against Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and confidant of many in the upper eschelon of the Islamic Republic. Rafsanjani is disliked by many Iranians on the street because of perceived abuses of power while in office that resulted in his becoming a very rich man. He is also probably the closest thing the Iranians have to a true political operator, someone who can conjure support at home while inspiring trust in Western governments (Iranians dislike him for that, too). With many reform-minded voters staying home out of protest, Ahmadinejad won easily, but let’s not kid ourselves, as one recent New York Times op-ed writer did, Iran would be governed no differently today had Rafsanjani won—the choice given to Iranians in last summer’s election was a sham. No major decision in the Islamic Republic is taken without the consent of the Ayatollah, and with or without Ahmadinejad, Iran would still pursue its nuclear weapons program. To be sure, Rafsanjani rarely displayed in his public life the relish in attacking Israel that Ahmadinejad has, but it is merely a difference in rhetoric. Rafsanjani is by nature a far more nuanced, intelligent, and sophisticated speaker whose threats are of the veiled variety. The ship of state, with either man at the helm, would be following the same course, and the aforementioned op-ed writer seems to forget that last summer’s election did not pit reformer versus hard-liner—it was a contest between two hard-liners, which makes his criticism of the Bush administration (for its alleged tacit approval of an election boycott) seem shrill and a tad hysterical.



But Iran is an anomaly in today’s Near East. While there is no shortage of autocratic governments and one-party states, relatively few are overtly hostile to the United States, and fewer still are theocracies. Why, then, is the United States so keen to introduce democracy into the region, a move that, were it ever carried out, would bring to power, from Casablanca to Kandahar, precisely those folks whose interests diverge from those of the West?

This is the confusion that Hamas’ victory has kicked up in Washington, particularly so since the election itself was one of the freest and fairest ever carried out in the Arab world. We can be reasonably sure that the true voice of the Palestinian people has been heard. By extension, we need to be certain we understand what that voice is saying before launching retaliatory actions to ‘put Hamas in its place.’ The current feeling in Washington and in some European capitals seems to be frustration with the election result, and early indications point to a concerted Western policy of ostracizing a Hamas-led government, and to be sure, it would not require much Western action (or inaction, as the case may be) to send the Palestinian territories hurtling toward chaos. The PA is already on the brink of bankruptcy, and without outside funds, the state’s prospects would be extraordinarily bleak. Add to the financial woes an outside chance of civil war erupting between well-armed Fatah and Hamas militias, and it becomes clear that Hamas is learning very well the old adage ‘Be Careful What You Wish For,’ because in winning the election, the party has inherited an utterly dysfunctional, and perhaps ungovernable, state.

With Western governments spewing venom and Fatah fighters girding themselves for an armed confrontation, Hamas’ options are rather limited. One option is to enter into a governing ‘grand coalition’ with Fatah, but the electorate, after handing Hamas such an overwhelming Election Day victory, surely would not smile upon Fatah’s continuing presence in government. This is where Western ire plays into the hands of Hamas, because Hamas can claim to the Palestinian people that a coalition is the only viable option, and even worse, they can lay the blame for the continuance of Fatah’s power directly at the feet of those busybodies from America and Europe.

Hamas’ other option is to go it alone, which would risk civil war as well as reprisals from the West. Viewed singly, these threats would seem manageable by skilled politicians, but taken together, they are a powerful one-two punch that would ruin a Hamas-led government. To manage these two issues together would require exquisite timing. Chiefly, in assuaging the West’s primary concern—that Hamas disarm itself and become purely a political movement—Hamas runs the risk of institutional suicide, because Fatah still has among its number insurrectionists that it failed to disarm, such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, not to mention the bulk of the PA’s police force. Why would Hamas disarm and leave itself vulnerable to gun-toting Fatah militiamen?

The likelihood of the West, particularly the US, and Hamas reaching an understanding of some kind seems remote at this point; therefore, Hamas will more than likely seek out a coalition government in order to table those weightier questions concerning the very purpose and methods of the organization. We should know more in the coming days and weeks.

The rise of Hamas has placed before us some interesting questions of policy. Why, for example, has the West persisted in believing that Fatah is the beginning and end of the PA? While it may have spun off its armed insurgents, it still maintains somewhat decisive influence over them and wears spilled blood on its hands just as surely as Sinn Fein did. But we have chosen to legitimize them, mostly out of a desire to have someone to bargain with, and since we make it a core policy not to negotiate with terrorists, Fatah’s existence gives us someone to talk to. The irony is how, in splitting off its armed groups from its political party, Fatah has diluted its authority over them to the point that it can no longer act as a reliable partner to the West or Israel in negotiations. We can cut deals into the wee hours with Fatah, but Fatah’s ability to enforce a deal concerning its own people has collapsed. Would we ask that Hamas travel the same path? Currently, Hamas is a highly disciplined organization, at least when compared to Fatah. Consider, too, that Hamas’ policy is geared toward Israel solely. It does not attack other foreign nationals, and those who have died as a result of Hamas operations could be termed collateral losses, folks who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. This might not matter a whit to some, but it does in my view form the basis of distinguishing Hamas from other groups—such as the Iranian-funded and Syrian-trained Hezbollah—that are genuinely ‘terrorist’ in orientation. All of this is to say that, if we can find common ground with Fatah, why exclude Hamas out of hand? If Hamas is willing to moderate, if it is willing to transform itself into a political party, if it is willing to accept the existence of Israel next door, why not roll the dice and see if they can brought inside the process? But time is short, and at present, the shocking election result has not been shocking enough to make us to reevaluate our basic underlying policies.